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VALUES IN EDUCATION

By Dan W. Dodson

Undoubtedly a large portion of the conflict around education today is related to problems of values. In the early years in community life outside the school, the right to one's opinion and the opportunity to present that opinion for whatever it was worth was a dominant value.

As public education came to the fore, however, the concern about the schools being used as a transmission belt for value systems became paramount. What was not recognized was the fact that in homogeneous communities and in fact in many of those which were not homogeneous, those representing the dominant power structure almost unconsciously projected their values into the school program.

Illustrations are legion. Warner, et.al., in their study, *Democracy in Jonesville,* described the qualifications for school board members, i.e., they had to be Republicans, members of the Local Luncheon Club, and it helped if they were Presbyterians. In New York City a few years ago, a leading adult educator was denied an appointment to an important position, although in his examination he outdistanced his competitors by a considerable margin, because as a board member put it, he was a "protagonist of labor."

In the field of religion, of course, this has been an extremely sensitive point. This writer can recall in the small community in which he grew up in which they dismissed school for the religious services at the Methodist Church at eleven o'clock when that group was conducting a revival meeting. There was no criticism because the community was completely Protestant and they would have done the same for the Baptists had they held their "protracted" meeting during the time school was in session. Invariably the guest minister conducting the revivals would be brought to the school to speak to the student body. It is within recent years in heterogeneous communities

that the big controversies have arisen and the clash of values has assumed major proportions.

In a comparable vein, the education revolving about capital and labor has been dominantly a capital position. So much so, that supplementary text books in social studies dealing with labor interpretation of history are being used in some places.

Perhaps the most vicious clash involves the values related to the source of values. During the writer's employment with the Mayor's Committee on Unity of New York City, one member resigned because the group was hesitant about signing a statement to the effect that segregation was sinful because it violated natural law, i.e., values which were inherent in the order of things. The concept of man's democratic creation of values through process as an alternative to values which are the eternal verities is being promoted on a wide scale at the present time. The threat of this conception to the authoritarian approach is at once obvious. Here is presented an interesting area of exploration. Both groups agree to the democratic credo as to man's dignity and worth, although the reasons for agreement would be at opposite ends of the pole.

Many educators, no doubt, will find a tremendous attractiveness in the humanistic approach in the field of values and will perhaps run the risk of further endangering the school's relationship to groups whose concern is with authoritarian sources of value.

Professors Herrington and Livingston have proposed democracy as a criterion in social affairs in this number of the Journal. This, of course, supposes that one is standing on some ground which serves as a vantage point.

Another aspect of the problem which perhaps does not need elaboration here, but which cannot be excluded is that we have learned that it is difficult to indoctrinate values and expect them to perform as dynamic in the growth and development of the individual. For their generation and in each group, the values which are vital and dynamic are not those which are accepted simply as a creed or dogma, but are those which, while perhaps the crystalization of group experience of the past, have been examined, realistically tested, and integrated into individual personality as a vital dynamic of growth and development. The great challenge of education is perhaps the refitting of curricula so as to bring those who are in the process of growth and development to continuously examine the values which dominate their choices and to rediscover for themselves those

SOCIAL CLASS: CONCEPTUAL AND OPERATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE FOR EDUCATION*

Theodore I. Lenn

A large scale heterogeneous society cannot trust the transmission of its elaborate cultural heritage to capricious socialization processes.

Don J. Hagar.

It shall be the purpose of this essay to delineate the significance of the development of the concept of social class[1] for the educative process, especially during the past quarter-century.

Educational Prelude

That educators have long ago recognized the need for improvement of the educative process is attested by the almost constant concern that has been given by them to such areas as teaching methods and curriculum construction.[2]

Starting roughly with the World War I years, two major professional educational assaults were launched in behalf of "more effective teaching in the nation's schools." These have been the Progressive Education Association, with its emphasis on "freeing the child," and the movement spearheaded by Judd and confreres which gave rise to the scientific study of education. Both these programs of action, implicitly and/or explicitly, gave notice to the effect that "teachers were not reaching the children." The scientific-minded educators, in particular, devoted their efforts over the years, chronologically, as follows: (1) Analysis of subject matter, especially arithmetic and reading, on the assumption that much of it wasn't being absorbed because it was simply beyond the child's capacities, (2) Curriculum reconstruction on the basis of pupil maturation, (3) Development of activities programs, on the assumption that children's learning suffered because of lack of real fundamental life experiences, hence lacked *motivation* for learning.

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* I am indebted to Professor Louis E. Raths for helping me to clarify the ideas contained in this article.

[1] "By class is meant two or more orders of people who are believed to be, and are accordingly ranked by the members of the community, in socially superior and inferior positions." From W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, Vol. I), Yale 1941, p. 92.

[2] A review of the titles of the annual publications of the *National Society for the Study of Education* during the past half-century provides fruitful and chronological insight into these efforts.

It is with the latter position — the great emphasis on "laboratory experiences" — that American public school education is now absorbed. Evidence that this approach *is* "reaching" the pupil is still forthcoming. Possibly it is too early to measure results. Certainly such factors as the lack of trained teachers, limited equipment, and other similar limitations present real obstacles.

It appears that the most significant obstacle, however, still continues to stand in the way of "reaching" the schoolchild; viz., the inability of the teacher to understand the child *in the child's own total cultural milieu*. One of America's foremost sociological analysts of the educative process, the late Willard Waller, once put it as follows: "Children and teachers are not disembodied intelligences, not instructing machines and learning machines, but whole human beings tied together in a complex maze of social interconnections."[3] If one examines the total situational setting of the classroom in terms of modern scientific cultural analysis, it becomes poignantly apparent that treating a classroom of children as equals, as equals amongst themselves, and as equals with the teacher might be good normative democracy, but poor, if not impossible pedagogy. If such pure equality reigned in the make-up of each individual, it would be a denial of the emotional variations manifest in the human species. Different emotions, in effect, mean different needs. Meeting these needs is a prerequisite to "reaching'" the child.[4] But emotional behavior is in a very real sense symptomatic behavior, and an understanding of this *resultant-type* of behavior calls for an understanding of one of the most subtle of our sub-culture patterns, — social class. It is in the social-class situation that the *causative* roots for one's behavior are usually born, nourished, and often molded into a near-iron cast. "Class differences, so evident in the family and school life of the child, are fully maintained throughout the range of out-of-the-home activities."[5]

Cultural Background of the Class Structure in America

. . . the visitor from abroad meets everywhere in America an ideology denouncing class differences which is more pronounced and sanctioned by more patriotic pride than perhaps anywhere else in Western civilization. . . .

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[3] *The Sociology of Teaching*, Wiley, p. 1.

[4] Cf. Daniel A. Prescott, *Emotion and the Educative Process*, American Council on Education, 1938; Louis E. Raths, *An Application to Education of the Needs Theory*, Bronxville, New York: Modern Education Service, 1949; John Dollard et al., *Frustration and Aggression*, Yale, 1939.

[5] James H. S. Bossard, *The Sociology of Child Development*, Harper, 1948, p. 306.

This ideology permeates popular thinking to the degree that Americans in general do not recognize their own actual class status. Most Americans — in all social classes — believe they are "middle class."[6]

The tradition of democracy with its implicit idea of equality has developed side by side with a history of class distinction and class conflict. There is a dualism to democracy in America today. There is the illusory, ideal way of life toward which we strive and to which we give much "lip-service." Simultaneously there is the real, "down-to-earth" way of life that we actually live, and live with— the democracy of reality. The tradition of democratic idealism is strong. This makes us loath to admit to democratic realism, for this means admitting to inequalities.[7]

What is the role of the public school in such an apparent conflict milieu? Toward what ends do we educate? Are our students being recognized and understood by their teachers in terms of these very real, all-pervading and exceedingly subtle social class backgrounds? More specifically, are our students being recognized and understood by their teachers on the basis of their (the students') individual positions (status and roles) within this socio-cultural from context; and of their fullest present and future potentialities?

Speculation to Experimentation to Implementation.

So long as the subject of social class received only conceptual treatment from the sociologists, so also was the subject of only theoretical interest to the educators. In 1913, the educational historian, Frank P. Graves, assessing the "modern scientific movement" in education that was just then emerging, stated,

> . . . the use of the sciences in education as a means of preparing for life and the needs of society overlaps the modern sociological principle of furthering democracy, the best development of all classes, and the abandonment of artificial strata in society.[8]

Just as the larger task of the fathers of American sociology was given to broad social theorizing and with system making, remaining

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[6] Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, Harper, 1944, p. 670.

[7] See Walter R. Goldschmidt, "Social Class in America — A Critical Review," *American Anthropologist*, 52 (October - December, 1950), pp. 492-494, for a concise summary of "evidences for an American class system;" also W. Lloyd Warner, Marcia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America*, Science Research Associates, 1949, Chapters 1 and 15.

[8] *A History of Education in Modern Times*, MacMillan, 1913, p. 353.

almost completely removed from empirical research, so too, was this pre-World War I period very barren with regard to empirical class analysis. In the light of present-day retrospect, it appears that even the theoretical speculations of last generation's sociologists seem to have been culturally biased.

Page has noted,

> They were all, in one way or another, impressed by the anti-class elements of American democracy and by the social virtues of that "classless" segment of society— the middle class. For the outstanding elements of the middle class, at least so they thought, were its emphasis upon the *common* elements of a society and its negation of all separating barriers.[9]

It was during the period between the two World Wars that the sociology of broad historical perspective began to transfer its interests to empirical research. This was concomitant with the emergence of quantitative research techniques. It was during this period, and especially during the great depression decade, that strong scientific investigatory thrusts began to be levelled at such specific "social problem areas" as the family, delinquency, population, and such. In a short time, these research interests began to focus on the natural cultural context that housed these problems, viz., *the community*. Revealing this trend rather sharply were the two surveys of Muncie, Indiana, produced by the Lynds.[10] Particularly penetrating contrasts between business classes and working classes are pointed up in both volumes. The Lynds speak of the "emergence . . . of a small, self-conscious upper class from the earlier, more democratic situation, . . . (while at the same time there is a) clearer demarcation of another and larger group of families at the lower end of the business class as a Middletown 'middle class.' "[11]

Starting with the Lynd studies, social stratification has become an increasingly frequent object of investigation. It is today being studied not only by the sociologists, many of whom are still formulating theoretical constructs,[12] and by some psychologists,[13] but

[9] Charles H. Page, *Class and American Sociology*, Dial Press, 1940, p. 250.

[10] Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, *Middletown*, Harcourt, Brace, 1929; *Middletown in Transition*, Harcourt, Brace, 1937.

[11] Lynd and Lynd, *Middletown in Transition*, p. 455.

[12] Kingsley Davis, "A Conceptual Analysis of Stratification," *American Sociological Review*, 7 (June, 1942), pp. 309-321; Talcott Parsons, "An Analytical Approach to the Theory of Social Stratification," *The American*

most important for this essay, are the combined and the independent efforts of social anthropologists and educators, especially during the past decade.

It wasn't until W. Lloyd Warner, a social anthropologist, and his group (more recently referred to as the "Chicago School") came on the scene, that educators started to get some new answers as to why teachers were still not "reaching" their pupils. It was truly impossible for teachers to be cognizant of the ways of social class in its daily operational manifestations in the classroom, until the scientific techniques for class identification were first spelled out by the social scientists. Although sensitive observers had long ago pointed up the apparent class differences that permeated our way of life,[14] it wasn't until Warner's studies[15] were well on their way that an operational methodology for class identification was introduced into the literature.

From these initial *Yankee City* and allied researches, came the first approach at a systematic treatment on the relations between social class and the present American educative process. The monumental little volume that first summed things up was *Who Shall Be Educated?*. [16] By qualitative and quantitative analyses concerning the impact of social class on curricula choice in the secondary schools,

Journal of Sociology, 45 (May, 1940), pp. 841-862; E. Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types, and Status Interrelations," *American Sociological Review,* 9 (April, 1944), pp. 151-161; Paul K. Hatt, "Stratification in the Mass Society," *American Sociological Review,* 15 (April, 1950), pp. 216-222.

[13] Cf. Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes,* Princeton, 1949; Raymond B. Cattell, "The Concept of Social Status," *Journal of Social Psychology,* 15 (May, 1942), pp. 293-308. Hadley Cantril, "Identification with Social and Economic Class," in *Twentieth Century Psychology,* Philip Lawrence Harriman, editor, The Philosophical Library, 1946, pp. 146-152.

[14] Cf. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America,* Knopf, 1945 (originally printed in 1882); Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry,* Morrow, 1942; Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge for What?,* Princeton, 1939. Carl L. Becker, *Modern Democracy,* Yale 1941. The astute observations of some of our novelists needs also to be noted here; — e.g., Christopher Morley, *Kitty Foyle,* Lippincott, 1939; John P. Marquand, *The Late George Apley,* Grosset and Dunlap, 1940; Sinclair Lewis, *Babbitt,* Modern Library, 1922.

[15] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, Vol. I), 1941; Warner and Lunt, *The Status System of a Modern Community* (Yankee City Series, Vol. II), 1942; Warner and Leo Srole, *The Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups* (Yankee City Series, Vol. III), 1945; Warner and J. O. Low, *The Social System of a Modern Factory* (Yankee City Series, Vol. IV), 1947. All published at Yale.

[16] W. L. Warner, R. J. Havighurst, and M. B. Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?,* Harper, 1944.

and by investigating such issues as the relation between the social class distribution of children and the school grades they receive, and the relation of social class and how children rate their peers, the authors revealed a cultural backdrop that unmistakably demonstrates how public schools *may,* but at present *do not* serve as a sure ladder for upward mobility. "Education . . . is oriented to the middle class and therefore attracts the mobile lower-class person. At the same time, it tends to push ahead the mobile middle-class person; therefore education has different meanings and works on different principles for people of different classes.[17]

The most noteworthy achievements of the Warner group consist of the formulation of techniques in order to define and measure social class status empirically.[18] Its objective has been to classify individuals in the way in which they are actually classified by other members of their society in terms of acknowledged or implied inferiority and superiority with respect to certain qualities. The Warner group has sought out the empirical determination of social status by eliciting from interviewees their own judgment of the rank order of a representative number of members in various communities.

Closely aligned with Warner's researches, and often integrated with his investigations, have been the various studies sponsored by the Committee of Human Development of the University of Chicago. This group has provided a juncture for the conceptualization and methodology of the social scientists, on the one hand, and on the other, with the interests and needs of professional educators. Through this committee, the scientific formulations of Warner have been implemented by such professional educators as Allison Davis and Robert J. Havighurst in their spearhead cultural analyses of American education.[19] *Who Shall Be Educated?* was the product of the combined efforts of Warner and Loeb, the social scientists, and Havighurst, the educator.

Following the appearance of *Who Shall Be Educated?,* both the social scientists (including primarily anthropologists, social psychol-

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[17] Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb, *op. cit.,* p. 97.

[18] The Warner methodology was first presented in detail in Warner and Lunt, Yankee City Series, Volumes I and II, and more recently in W. L. Warner, Marcia Meeker, and Kenneth Eells, *Social Class in America—A Manual of Procedure for the Measurement of Social Status,* Science Research Associates, 1949.

[19] See especially Kenneth Eells, Allison Davis, Robert J. Havighurst, Virgil Herrick, and Ralph Tyler, *Intelligence and Cultural Differences,* Chicago, 1951.

ogists, and sociologists) and a small number of culturally and scientifically oriented professional educators began to attack with much zeal the interconnections of class and education in contemporary America.

In 1948, Harvard University invited Allison Davis to present the Inglis Lecture for that year. Davis' topic, "Social-Class Influences Upon Learning,"[20] went even further in highlighting some basic issues that had been presented in *Who Shall Be Educated?*. Davis examined certain differences among the social classes in the United States with respect to the basic socialization of the child. In scrutinizing manner, Davis pointed up the cultural bias that exists in our present mental tests.

Two years later, Davis presented the real "eye-opener" to the American public. Addressing the Mid-Century White House Conference on Children and Youth, Davis stated, "More than 70 out of every 100 of our elementary school children come from . . . lower socio-economic groups . . . · (but) more than 95 out of every 100 teachers are from the middle socio-economic groups."[21] Could this be the great cultural divide that was preventing American teachers from "reaching" their pupils?

It appears from the Davis statistics that the average American school teacher, representing a cultural way of life very much different from that of most her pupils, cannot but fail to understand the very large majority of her pupils unless she first understands the social structure within which she operates. This would include, obviously, the cultural way of life of her pupils. Simply having a rough idea of the economic level of her pupils does not, *ipso facto,* insure a meaningful assessment of the child's cultural setting. The many mores and other numerous factors that motivate the behavior of her pupils cannot be appreciated in their most meaningful sense when a wide social distance prevails. Davis has stated that "the most urgent problem for the public schools is to learn the motivational structure of lower-class children and adolescents."[22] The American teacher has either been born into the middle-class or has worked up into this class. Middle-class values are prized highly and taken very seriously. As a representative of middle-class attitudes, she is bent on enforcing these middle-class values and manners. Inevitably, and for the most part unconsciously, pupils are judged by these middle-

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[20] *Social-Class Influences Upon Learning,* Harvard, 1948. This work has been greatly expanded in Eells et al., *Intelligence and Cultural Differences.*

[21] "Socio-Economic Influences Upon Children's Learning," Address delivered at National Guard Armory, Washington. D. C., December 5, 1950.

[22] A. Davis, *Social-Class Influences Upon Learning,* p. 22.

class standards.[23] "In the competition for these symbols of achievement, some children always seem to come out on top while some children never even come close."[24]

It would appear that what actually takes place is tantamount to the superimposition by the teacher of her middle-class culture upon the pupil, with little or no comprehension of the pupil's real needs or his capacities for receptivity.[25]

The year 1949 brought into print the Warner methodology in systematic form.[26] During this same year, three empirical inquiries appeared, with sharp focus on social class as it is operationally interwoven with the educative process. [27] Two of these latter works, *Democracy in Jonesville* and *Elmtown's Youth* are substantive studies based generally on the Warner methodology. Both *Elmtown* and *Jonesville* refer to the same community,—Rockford, Illinois. Hollingshead was part of the *Jonesville* research team and contributed to the *Jonesville* study, but managed to accumulate more data on his own concerning the adolescent social class sub-culture of Rockford. This latter data provides the content for *Elmtown's Youth*.

Although the *Jonesville* study is not essentially an examination of class in the educative process, it nevertheless does provide a well-documented setting of the social class sub-culture within which the child's socialization process moves along. In addition, there are specific treatments given to childhood and adolescence in school. A concluding remark from *Jonesville* pointedly states:

> . . . lower-class boys and girls who manage to force their way up the social ladder are few; and the price they pay is usually dear. For in a society in which middle-class values are dominant, the lower-class child, if he is to be successful, must manage to discard the pattern of living and the pattern of thinking that he has learned from his family. He must fight the social-class stereotypes which operate so forcefully against him from earliest childhood. . . . It is little wonder that, faced with so formidable a task, few are successful.[28]

The *Brasstown* study explores children's awareness of symbols of social class at different grade levels. It provides considerable em-

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[23] Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb, *Who Shall Be Educated?*, Chapter 8.

[24] Louis E. Raths and Stephen Abrahamson, *Student Status and Social Class*, Bronxville, New York: Modern Educational Service, 1950, p. 13.

[25] See Margaret Mead, *The School in the American Culture*, Harvard, 1951, for sharp background understandings that underly this issue.

[26] Warner, Meeker, and Eells, *op. cit.*

[27] W. L. Warner and Associates, *Democracy in Jonesville*, Harper, 1949; A. B. Hollingshead, *Elmtown's Youth*, Wiley, 1949; Celia B. Stendler, *Children of Brasstown*, Illinois, 1949.

[28] Warner, *Democracy in Jonesville*, p. 88.

pirical evidence to demonstrate that the structuring of social class
begins to take root in the elementary grades. Stendler categorically
declares, ". . . *Brasstown* is a class town and has its class system,
tacitly accepted but never openly acknowledged by its residents."[29]

Elmtown provides evidence that social class distinctions continue
to operate, possibly with greater intensity, in the high school. Hol-
lingshead states, ". . . the systematic analysis of selected cultural
traits . . . reveal that the possession of a constellation of differen-
tially evaluated social symbols . . . (e.g., wealth, education, lineage,
etc.), are relied on by Elmtowners to 'hang people on the peg they
belong on', to determine 'their place in the community' or 'their
standing in life'."[30] Having established the existence of class in the
community, Hollingshead further establishes its definitive existence
in the high school. He then states, ". . . we can conclude with con-
fidence that adolescents who have been raised in families that
possess different class cultures may be expected to follow different
behavior patterns in their responses to situations . . ."[31]

Very shortly after the publication of the *Jonesville, Elmtown,* and
Brasstown studies, there was published a cogently worded booklet
of less than twenty pages by Louis E. Raths and Stephen Abraham-
son, entitled *Student Status and Social Class.*[32] This concise, readable,
and to-the-point booklet, provides an overview of the class structure
in America today, and in very simplified terms presents step-by-step
instructions for using the Warner techniques to identify social class.
It also provides a precise body of information concerning the use
of class identification in the classroom situation with regard to meet-
ing the emotional needs of the school child. This booklet has made
possible the use of class analysis in the classroom by the regular
classroom teacher who normally might not possess any special
training in class analysis.

It should be noted here that Raths and others at the New York
University Center for Human Relations Studies — much of it in
cooperation with The Bureau of Intercultural Education — are also
giving a strong stimulus to research in this whole area.[33] One of the
most notable researches to come from this source is Stephen Abra-
hamson's study concerning social class impingement on the distribu-

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[29]   Stendler, *op. cit.,* p. 20.
[30]   Hollingshead, *op. cit.,* pp. 83-84.
[31]   *Ibid.,* p. 441.
[32]   See footnote 24.
[33]   See especially Louis E. Raths, "Social Class Investigations," *The Jour-
nal of Educational Sociology,* 25 (April, 1952), pp. 488-492.

tion of school rewards and punishments. Abrahamson states,

> . . . there was found a relationship in which the students of higher
> social-class backgrounds received a disproportionately large share of the
> rewards and a disproportionately small share of the punishments, while
> students of lower social class backgrounds received a disproportionately
> small share of the rewards and a disproportionately large share of the
> punishments.[34]

It is certainly necessary to mention various other (non-Warner) formulations concerning class in America today. Amongst these are the Centers method of class consciousness,[35] the Kinsey method of determining social level,[36] Kaufman's use of judges[37] the statistical approaches devised by Chapin, [38] and Sewell,[39] and the many investigations that have been conducted by the use of sociometric measurements.[40] Possibly any one of these formulations, or some schemes still to be devised may have even stronger implications for education in years to come.

Indeed, not until almost forty years after Graves had intoned his normative estimate concerning "the best development of all classes" as an educational principle, was Dodson able to state in a more meaningful and a considerably more *de facto* setting:

> Social class is becoming increasingly recognized as a dynamic in education.
> Whether one subscribes to the Warner classification or not, the factor
> of social status permeates the entire endeavor from teacher behavior to
> child motivation. Many researches in many directions, are spelling out the
> relationships involved.[41]

We have thus surveyed the near parallelism that has existed between the conceptual and operational treatments that have been given

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[34] Stephen Abrahamson, "School Rewards and Social-Class Status," *Educational Research Bulletin*, 31 (January 16, 1952), pp. 8-15. This report is based on the same author's, *A Study of the Relationship Between the Social Class Background of Junior High School Students and the Rewards and Punishments of the Junior High Schools*. Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1951.

[35] Richard Centers, *op. cit.*

[36] Alfred C. Kinsey et al., *Sexual Behavior in the Human Male*, Saunders. 1948.

[37] Harold F. Kaufman, "Defining Prestige in a Rural Community," *Sociometry Monographs*, No. 18, Beacon House, 1946.

[38] F. Stuart Chapin, *Contemporary Social Institutions*, Harper, 1935, p. 378.

[39] W. H. Sewell, "A Short Form of the Farm Family Socio-Economic Status Scale," *Rural Sociology*, 8 (June, 1943), pp. 161-170.

[40] Urie Bronfenbrenner, "The Measurement of Sociometric Status, Structure and Development," *Sociometry Monographs*, No. 6, Beacon House, 1945.

[41] Dan Dodson, "Editorial," *The Journal of Educational Sociology*, 25 (April, 1952), p. 437. (This entire issue, under the guest editorship of Louis E. Raths, is devoted to the subject of "Social Class and Teacher Training.").

to the phenomenon of social class by sociologists and anthropologists and the consideration that educators have given to this same subject.

Some questions must now be raised with regard to the implications that all this might hold for education. Is class analysis to be regarded as *the* insight into all human behavior? Hardly. Present-day sociologists and educators are much too sophisticated to accept monocausation as an explanation for general behavior in any form. To the extent that class analysis is to be *used* in the educative process, how actually is it to be *used?* What if the classroom teacher does identify the social class status of her pupils and on the basis of such distribution proceeds to disseminate rewards and punishments commensurately? To what extent will group pressures impinge on such action? To what extent, also, might this type of practice result in the maladjustment of many of our children? Warner and others have stated, "The school in America, whether we like it or not, must function to make democracy work in a status system that is only partially equalitarian."[42] What does the word *function* mean in this sense? Does this mean that the schools *must* be geared to the *status quo* structure, and that all the talk we give to *leadership* must mean leadership in the most restrictive sense, viz., *competency for blind adjustment to what is,* and never to give direction to what might yet be, — in terms of those normative codes that underly our very ideology?[43] If educators, in theory, believe that the rewards assigned to students in public schools should be distributed according to merit, then what is to constitute *merit?* Should it be intelligence, or emotional needs, or social behavior, or a combination of these, or possibly something altogether different?

One is pressed hard to conclude all this, without taking cognizance of the value-system that underlies both our thoughts and actions. Assuming that our educational system can arrest the apparent trend toward the stratification of society, does the society at large *really* want this to be done? If we do, is not the request scientifically naive, when it is an obvious cultural truism that our educational system is so very highly integrated with the total social structure?

Indeed social scientists and educators will need to face these issues in their future class-oriented researches.

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[42]   Warner, Havighurst, and Loeb, *op. cit.,* p. 143.
[43]   Theodore I. Lenn, "Cultural Lag, the Status Quo and Teacher Education," *The Journal of Teacher Education,* 1 (December, 1950), pp. 268-273.
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THE RELATION BETWEEN CURRICULUM ENTERED BY WHITE PROSPECTIVE SCHOOLTEACHERS AND THEIR ATTITUDES TOWARD NEGROES

Chester M. Stephenson

A search of the current literature yields much information on the subject of intergroup education. Glicksberg[1] describes and criticizes the movement. Chatto and Halligan[2] and Alland and Wise[3] explain the program of intergroup education in the public schools of Springfield, Massachusetts. Cook[4] and others describe twenty-four college projects designed to explore and improve teacher education in the field of intergroup relations. But as far as can be ascertained, most prospective teachers receive the same "treatment" regardless of the attitudes that they bring to the campus with them. College curricula are being modified in the name of intergroup education, but there seems to be very little information on the relation between the attitudes of white prospective schoolteachers toward the members of the various minority groups and the curriculum that these future teachers enter. Students choosing one curriculum may have more, or less, favorable attitudes toward minorities than students choosing other curricula.

Consideration of this situation has led to the problem which this paper proposes to discuss, namely: In their attitudes toward Negroes, what significant differences, if any, exist between freshmen in the different curricula?

The study was limited to the attitudes toward Negroes because of the importance and size of this minority. It was also limited in that it only included a sample of the freshman students in one of the six state universities in Ohio.

Both forms of the Hinckley Scale[5] were given to all students in

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[1] Glicksberg, Charles I. "Intercultural Education: Utopia or Reality." *Common Ground*, 6 No. 4 (Summer, 1946).

[2] Chatto, Clarence I., and Halligan, Alice L. *The Story of the Springfield Plan.* New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1945.

[3] Alland, Alexander, and Wise, James Watterman. *The Springfield Plan.* New York: The Viking Press, 1945.

[4] Cook, Lloyd Allen, Ed. *College Programs in Intergroup Relations: Volume I.* Washington, D. C.: The American Council on Education, 1950.

[5] Hinckley, E. D. *Attitude Toward the Negro*, Scale No. 3, Forms A and B, Thurstone, L. L., Editor. *The Measurement of Social Attitudes.* Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1930.

Education 105 at Miami University during the fall semester of the school year 1948-49. This course is required of all first semester freshmen in all curricula in Education (Table 3) unless it is impossible for them to take it due to course scheduling problems. The total score of each student was obtained by following the plan of Sims and Patrick of averaging the scores of the A and B Forms[6]

The reliability of the research instrument was measured by correlating the scores on Form A with those on Form B. For an N of 315, the r was .71, the P E .02, and the r^2. 50. The estimated reliability of Form A plus Form B was .83[7] The r obtained here compares favorably with those reported in other studies. Sims and Patrick reported r's of .70, .73, and .78 for N's of 97, 156, and 115 respectively when they used two forms of the Hinckley Scale together as in this study[8] F. Treadwell Smith at Teachers College, Columbia University, in his control group of 219 students in a five week test-re-test study found r's of .70 for the Hinckley Form A and .68 for Hinckley Form B.[9]

A difference in attitude due to sex could affect the results since some of the categories to be compared have only women students, others only men students, and others both women and men students in varying proportions. Thus it was necessary to select a matched sample of women and men to determine if sex was a complicating factor. The groups were matched as to curricular categories and signatures or lack of signatures on the schedules. The data resulting from the female-male sample are in Table 1.

The only difference between the two groups is in the dispersion of scores. The slightly larger standard deviation of the men indicates that they constitute a more heterogeneous group than the women in regard to attitudes toward Negroes.

These findings seem to agree with those of Minard in his study of the race attitudes of Iowa children from grades seven to twelve. He states: "Sex does not seem to affect race attitudes except that

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[6] Sims, Verner M., and Patrick, James R. "Attitudes Toward the Negro of Northern and Southern College Students." *Journal of Social Psychology,* 7, No. 2 (May, 1936), p. 193.

[7] Estimate by *"Spearman-Brown formula for estimating reliability from two comparable halves of a test"* from Garrett, Henry E. *Statistics in Psychology and Education.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co., 1937, p. 319.

[8] Sims and Patrick, *op. cit.,* p. 193.

[9] Smith, F. Treadwell. *An Experiment in Modifying Attitudes Toward the Negro.* New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, pp. 6-122.

there is a greater variability among boys.[10] There seems to be agreement even to the greater standard deviations for the men than for the women.

Sims and Patrick found that differences in intelligence were not statistically significant when they gave the Otis Self-Administering Test of Mental Ability with the Hinckley Scale.[11] This would have been the ideal procedure in this study, but the schedules were given in the classes of other instructors, and time was a limiting factor. Therefore, the factor of intelligence had to be approached indirectly. Some students took advantage of the invitation to sign the schedules. The scores of these people on the American College Entrance Examination were secured from the Student Guidance Clinic and correlated with their scores on the Hinckley Scale. Even though the 63 people who signed their schedules may be termed a select group, the r was only .35, the P E .08, and r² .12.

Table 1.   Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Errors of the Means of Matched Samples of Women and Men.

	N	M	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{m}$
Women	45	7.72	.78	.12
Men	45	7.72	.90	.13

Table 2.   Means, Standard Deviations, and Standard Errors of the Means of a Matched Sample of Veterans and Non-Veterans.

	N	M	$\sqrt{}$	$\sqrt{m}$
Veterans	22	7.61	.69	.15
Non-Veterans	22	7.51	.76	.17

The factor of military service could complicate the comparisons between categories, especially where one category was made up entirely of women and the other entirely of men. No woman in the sample had been in the armed forces. Since there were so few veterans, 22, in the freshman class to match with non-veterans, the non-veterans were matched with the veterans. The same general procedure used for the women and men was also used to secure the matched sample of veterans and non-veterans. The results are given in Table 2.

The difference between the means of .10 is not large enough to bother calculating the significance of the difference. Thus, service

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[10] Minard, Ralph Day. *Race Attitudes of Iowa Children*. Iowa City: The University, 1930, p. 64.

[11] Sims and Patrick, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

in the armed forces as well as sex and intelligence is not a complicating factor.

The answer to the question, in their attitudes toward Negroes, what significant differences, if any, exist between freshmen in different curricula, is based upon the data in Table 3. The categories in the table differ slightly from the curricula of the school in that the Three-and Two-Year Elementary Education curricula have been combined. This was done partly because of small frequencies, but more so because the two curricula are practically identical in content, both being stop-gap courses entered by people who expect not to get a degree soon, or perhaps never. In order to make the difference more graphic the curricula are listed in order of decreasing size of means.

Table 3. Enrollments in Curricula, N's, Means, and Standard Deviations of the Means of Education Freshmen in Order of Decreasing Size of Means.

Curriculum	Enrollment	N	M	$\sqrt{}$
1. Mathematics-Science	28	21	7.87	.91
2. Music Education	24	22	7.81	.71
3. Health and Physical Education for Women	25	24	7.75	.65
4. Social Science	14	14	7.74	.59
5. 3-2 Year Elementary Education	32	24	7.73	.77
6. 4-Year Elementary Education	114	88	7.63	.84
7. Home Economics	22	21	7.55	.80
8. Physical and Health Education for Men	50	42	7.39	.84
9. Language	22	20	7.39	.90
10. Art Education	6	6	7.37	.49
11. Business Education	6	5	7.32	.51
12. Industrial Arts Education and Physical Education for Men	14	13	7.11	.94
13. Industrial Arts Education	16	15	7.08	.83
Total	373	315	7.57	.85

Even though some of the categories are small, and the square root of N-1 (n) instead of the square root of N was used in calculating the standard errors of the means where the N's were less than 30,[12]

[12] Peters, Charles C., and Van Voorhis, Walter R. *Statistical Procedures and Their Mathematical Bases*. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1940, p. 172.

there are significant differences between the mean scores of some of the curricular groups. The significance of the differences between the means was calculated by the small-sample technique of Student as redeveloped by Fisher. The t value is the quotient of the difference between the means divided by the standard error of difference. The probability, P, is determined directly from "Fisher's Table of the Distribution of t for Certain Probability Levels," and depends upon the magnitude of the t and the n.[18] In this study the n of the smaller of the pair of the two categories being compared was used in determining the P. The P represents the probability of getting the obtained difference if the true difference were zero.

Peters and Van Voorhis make the following statement in regard to the interpretation of the P values: "Most of the Fisher tables are constructed on the principle that we care only to know if the probability is as low as 5 per cent, or if as low as 1 per cent, that the difference could have arisen by chance. If it reaches 5 per cent, he calls it significant; and if it reaches 1 per cent, he calls it highly significant. In view of the manner in which the Fisher tables are constructed, his 5 per cent corresponds, in the case of a normal distribution, to a t of 1.96 and his 1 per cent to a t of 2.58."[14]

The compared pairs of curricular categories which have probabilities which Fisher would term "highly" significant and significant plus a third group which the writer has labeled "near" significant are in Table 4. The "near" significant group was included since they have P's of .05 to .10 and Fisher labels a P of .05 significant.

Table 4. Means, Differences Between Means of Compared Pairs of Curricula of Education Freshmen, t's, and P Values by Degree of Significance and by Compared Pairs of Curricula in Order of Decreasing Size of t's.

Significance and Major	N	M	M_1-M_2	t	P*
"Highly" Significant					
Music Education	22	7.81			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.73	2.70	.01-.02
Mathematics-Science	21	7.87			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.79	2.63	.01-.02
Significant					
Health and Physical Education					
for Women	24	7.75			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.67	2.58	.02-.05
Social Science	14	7.74			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.66	2.44	.02-.05

[13] *Ibid.*, pp. 171-175.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 176.

3-2 Year Elementary Education	24	7.73			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.65	2.41	.02-.05
4-Year Elementary Education	88	7.63			
—Industrial Arts Education	15	7.08	.55	2.29	.02-.05
Music Education	22	7.81			
—Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.70	2.26	.02-.05
Mathematics-Science	21	7.87			
—Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.76	2.24	.02-.05
"Near" Significant					
Health and Physical Education					
for Women	24	7.75			
—Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.64	2.13	.05-.10
"Near" Significant					
Social Science	14	7.74			
—Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.63	2.03	.05-.10
3-2 Year Elementary Education	24	7.73			
--Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.62	2.00	.05-.10
Mathematics-Science	21	7.87			
—Physical and Health Education					
for Men	42	7.39	.48	2.00	.05-.10
4-Year Elementary Education	88	7.63			
—Industrial Arts Education and					
Physical Education for Men	13	7.11	.52	1.86	.05-.10

* Probability estimates (P) are from "Fisher's Table of the Distribution of *t* for Certain Probability Levels" in Peters, Charles C., and Van Voorhis, Walter R., *op. cit.*, p. 173.

It will be noticed from Table 4 that only in the cases where the P's were in the .01 to .10 probability range were the compared pairs of curricula included in the table.

If Fisher's P value of .05 or less is accepted as the criterion of a "significant" difference, it may be stated without reservation that students who enter the Music Education, Mathematics-Science, Health and Physical Education for Women, Social Science, Three-Two Year Elementary Education, and Four-Year Elementary Education curricula have more favorable attitudes toward Negros than students who intend to become Industrial Arts teachers. Further, the prospective Music Education and Mathematics-Science teachers in this study are more favorably inclined toward Negroes than students starting in the combined Industrial Arts Education and Physical Education for Men program. Differences between the mean scores of the students in the various other curricula exist, but they decrease in significance from these differences until they lose significance.

From a comparison of Table 4 with Table 3 it appears that the curricula might be divided into three large divisions. The first six curricula in Table 3 might be termed the most liberal group, the bottom two the least liberal group, and the five in between, numbers 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11, the middle. The curricular groups could also be classified into two large categories—groups with means above the mean score of all Education freshmen and groups with means below. The mean score of all freshmen in Education of 7.57 would still put the dividing line between the "liberal" and "middle" groups.

If intergroup education should be attempted at this university in order that future teachers will be more adequately prepared to conduct such programs in the public schools, it appears that first attention should be given to students entering the curricula of Industrial Arts Education and Industrial Arts and Physical Education for Men. Next, if time and facilities are available, attention should be directed toward the students in the various other curricula in an order reverse to that in which they appear in Table 3. This approach appears more logical than one which would subject all students to the same treatment.

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DEMOCRACY AS A CRITERION IN SOCIAL AFFAIRS

George S. Herrington and John C. Livingston

The Essence of Democracy

Democracy is a way of living in which all people are becoming more eager, able and free to participate directly and indirectly in the determination, administration and revision of social and public policies affecting their welfare[1] in all areas and on all levels of experience.

Such a way of living progresses with the increasing development of mutual respect, cooperation and use of reason or intelligence as the major means by which common policies or purposes may be determined and implemented. The familiar statements included under the headings Civil Liberties, Bill of Rights, Four Freedoms, Academic Freedom and Free Inquiry lay down the necessary conditions to the development of the democratic means referred to above.

Democracy and the Solution of Social Problems

Human beings interact with one another and in groups in geographical and cultural environments in carrying on life-sustaining and life-enriching activities. Out of this social process, culture is created —additions are made to the "knowledge fund." The social process, however, takes place through that part of the cultural environment known as institutions. They transmit other aspects of the culture and provide the social framework and patterns of dynamic inter-action through which men carry on the activities instrumental to existence. Out of this social process comes an increasing body of scientific knowledge and technology—a common, continuous and dy-namic factor in social life—making it necessary for men to modify their institutional patterns of behavior in order to realize the new potentialities in the "fund" and in order to eliminate the undesirable social effects that may result from the changing conditions induced by the new developments.

Democracy appears to be the only way of life in which men can make the continuous institutional adjustments required in response to changing conditions. The inclusive goal in determining these adjustments is to find solutions to social problems, solutions dependent upon and arising out of the available alternatives as to how best to realize the present potentialities inherent in the "knowledge fund."

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[1] This statement concerning the essence of democracy includes the idea that people ought to decide what affects their welfare.

In terms of the individual it means making the most efficient utilization of existing knowledge that will permit him to participate creatively in the social process to the fullest extent of his capacity. We use the expert, so necessary in our interdependent and complex society, to help implement the policy. We try out the policy by means of the best implementation that can be devised and view the consequences. New policy and its implementation can then be worked out in terms of the new knowledge gained from the implementation of the old policy and its observed consequences in experience.

The position taken by many social scientists with respect to social problems is that they are conditions or aspects of society which people, few or many, recognize and are trying to change. This conclusion usually follows a discussion of the limitations of various concepts for ascertaining the determinants of social problems; such as, cultural lag, cultural inconsistency, cultural disequilibrium, cultural incoordination, human needs, social disorganization, and social pathology.[2] No attempt is made to indicate a scientific basis for determining the existence of a problem. If few or many people think a problem exists, it does. A scientific approach to the identification and solution of a problem is avoided as being a problem of value. Since values vary and are personal and relative, the scientific determination of the best alternative solution is impossible. The position comes to rest in the view that value enters social analysis as a determinant of a final choice from among possible alternatives after the data concerning the "what is" of some problem that people think exists have been accumulated scientifically. What to do about the problem becomes anybody's guess.

The nebulousness and the essential irrationality of most current concepts relating to the existence, determinants and solutions of social problems rest on a misconception of the role and function of "value" in social problem analysis. Discussion of values in much of the literature might seem to suggest that they are ends or goals conceived as desirable. But if the word be viewed in the context of its usage it becomes clear that what is generally meant is the *criterion* in terms of which judgments of good and bad, better and worse, enter the analysis. This distinction is important. If values can be taken to mean ends or goals, then presumably the distinction between a science of means and a philosophy of ends might be maintained; provided, of course, that our minds are "open" enough to permit us

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[2]For a typical example of this approach to social problems see Carl M. Rosenquist. *Social Problems*. N. Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1947. pp. 1-23.

to conceive of the co-existence in the same inquiry of the rational, objective determination of means and the irrational, subjective determination of ends; and provided, we can rationally determine when to apply our irrational value judgments. Such, however, is not the case. The significance of conceptions of value is that they serve as criteria of judgment. Indeed, on closer inspection, this seems to be the almost universal referent for the word in so far as one can be discovered at all.

If the significance of value be viewed as the operational application of a criterion of judgment in the process of inquiry, then, quite obviously, it is operative and determinant at all stages of inquiry. Further, no effort to draw distinctions in kind at different stages of inquiry in terms of the attribute of value will stand. The initial judgment as to the existence or non-existence of a problem is necessarily a matter of value and consistent with all judgments which follow in inquiry. An example may clarify the point. To the observer applying the classical notion of price as the measure of value and the ability to pay as the valid measure of social participation, the present conjuncture of circumstances in which some persons do not have "adequate" housing would not appear to be a problem. The same criterion specifies maintaining the existing institutional pattern—which is itself the expression in a particular pattern of behavior of this criterion—as the final choice from among alternatives.

If the position taken above that values (as criteria of judgment) are necessarily involved at every stage of social inquiry—and if it is also true that values (in the same sense) are relative, subjective and irrational—then the obvious impasse in social science is evident. One immediate consequence is that we shall have to drop either the "social" or the "science" from the designation of our discipline if we are to retain any integrity. Our academic slip is showing—so far that even the freshman student in the back row has begun to notice. Fact-gathering in an essentially irrational situation has never made sense to freshman students in the social sciences. The curious thing is that teachers have been able to advocate this procedure with such "objectivity," passion and persistence.

The writers advance the hypothesis that the essence of democracy, as herein defined, constitutes a scientifically warrantable criterion of judgment for determining the existence, determinants and solutions of social problems. This criterion of judgment makes untenable the idea that one man's opinion is as good as another's with respect to the existence and solution of any given social problem. It makes it possible for men to face the problem of value on a scientific basis.

The hypothesis advanced is that the existence and determinants of a social problem can be scientifically (evidentially) determined to be those institutional behavior patterns or practices which employ some criterion or criteria which array persons in a pattern of relative prestige and power thereby preventing the efficient use of the scientific knowledge available in the "fund." The best alternative solution of a social problem can be evidentially established to be that one which appears most likely to eliminate the invidious criterion or criteria identified as the determinants of the problem, enabling, therefore, the institution or institutions involved to perform their instrumental (life-sustaining and life-enriching) functions more efficiently.[3]

The knowledge in the "fund" (a continuously growing storehouse of tested knowledge) exists for us to see. Whether or not current institutions are using this knowledge effectively in correlating or integrating the behavior of people is also susceptible to evidential determination. Effectiveness is a matter of providing the institutional opportunities for people to realze their instrumental uniquenesses and potentialities. Instrumental in this connection means those choices and activities which are referenced in the "sense of workmanship" as distinguished from invidious judgments and behavior which rest on prestige and power considerations. Patterns of invidious discrimination always come to focus in policy-determination; they vest policy-determination in a particular segment of the community on the grounds that the interest and welfare of the community at large are served thereby. It is—and has always been—this power and prestige aspect of institutional patterns that precludes giving social effect to new developments in the "knowledge fund." The solution of social problems requires—and always has—a change in the pattern of policy-determination and, therefore, in the invidiously based values (criteria of judgment) in terms of which prestige and discretion over other people's behavior is implemented and justified.[4] In the analysis of any particular problem, then, the institutional adjustment (hypothesis) that appears most likely to util-

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[3]The writers, at this point, wish to acknowledge their indebtedness in this analysis to the progressive development of these ideas, especially, in the writings of Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, and C. E. Ayres.

[4]An examination of the relation between "values," institutional power systems, and the scientific-technological continuum in the historical process, or of current problems in the American or world communities supports this position. With regard to the historical process, no other hypothesis explains as well the evidence with regard to the cumulative character of human experience. Similarly, a random selection of current problems illustrates and supports the hypothesis. The problem of prejudice is the problem of denial of

ize best the knowledge pertinent to a particular problem, after a critical analysis of all possible alternatives is made, will be that alternative which is within the comprehension of the community and which most effectively modifies the invidious distinction which is the locus of the problem. This alternative can then be put to the test of its effectiveness in providing opportunity for participation in the light of experience.

It is to be noted that the process of making decisions as to needed institutional adjustments in the solution of social problems is a policy-determining process. The democratic way of life admits no invidious criterion in determining who shall or shall not participate in the creation of policy. Such discrimination makes it impossible for some, if not many people, to realize their personal potentialities and their potential contributions to the community and to the solution of its problems. It is the use of some criterion of inequality with regard to whom shall participate in policy-determination that distinguishes most fundamentally the authoritarian way of living from the democratic way of life. All of the problems in our society today have their locus in the very fact that such discrimination exists, the result being an ineffective or non-use of existing knowledge. The problems associated with minority groups in our nation, for example, cannot be solved as long as the people composing these groups are denied participation in policy-determination on invidious grounds; and as long as they, likewise, are denied equality of opportunity in gaining access to the "knowledge fund" upon which valid policy-determination must be based.

Moreover, these invidious criteria, as they work out in human relations, are extended to judgments about the relative moral worth of social institutions. The institutional structures through which invidious distinctions are made effective in policy-determination are posited to be uniquely capable of carrying on social life: thus the exclusive concern of capitalist theory with business enterprise institutions; of communist theory with government; of fascist theory with party; of patriarchies with the family. The criterion of judg-

participation on invidious grounds of race, religion, etc. The problem of medical care is the problem of denying participation in the use of medical science and technology through a pattern of policy-determination referenced in business enterprise institutions and the "ability to pay" as an invidious criterion of participation. The locus of the invidious bases of such problems as crime, delinquency, divorce, etc. is more difficult to determine but not different in kind. An analysis and solution of such problems may require the identification of invidious distinctions in several institutional areas—the economic system, the family, the school, etc.

ment implicit in the theory specifies a pattern of power and prestige in the community realizable through a particular institutional structure. Hence, democracy necessarily means more than the right to participate in policy-determination. It means the progressive extension of the democratic (non-invidious) criterion of judgment to all relationships in the community; and it means further, that no institution may be considered intrinsically good—that all are to be judged and modified on non-invidious grounds.

The Tools of Democracy

Democracy as a criterion of judgment in social affairs or in the solution of social problems is validated by and realized through the development and application of the tools of democracy viewed as means for making rational institutional adjustments. These tools with their supporting or reinforcing data and concepts follow:

I. Development of Mutual Respect
1. Mutual respect is based upon the equality of persons to human and citizenship rights; upon the non-existence of any valid criterion which accords some men and not others the right to determine social and public policies affecting all;[5] includes the idea that men should possess equality of political, economic and social opportunity. Any criterion which posits inequality as a basis for policy-determination necessarily precludes the realization by a part of the community of their potential, instrumental contribution to the community.
2. Christian social ethics constitute part of the heritage in the development of mutual respect—All Men Equal in the Sight of God; Brotherhood of Man; Golden Rule.
3. Mutual respect is reinforced by scientific data concerning the common origin and equality of races of men.
4. Liberty and freedom are implicit in the idea of mutual respect; they are functions of equality. The individualist tends to look upon freedom as freedom from and not inclusive of freedom for. What may look like restriction of freedom from an individualistic point of view may actually be an enlargement of freedom in the light of the interdependence of men in society and the need for the solution of problems of common concern.
5. Mutual respect helps to create and is reinforced by cooperative, self-directing individuals.[6]

II. Development of Cooperation.
1. Cooperation is necessary in an increasingly interdependent, changing and complex world, largely resulting from the development of the industrialization (mass production) process with its specialization of function, centralization, and integration or coordination of men, tools, techniques and resources.[7]

[5]Cf. Henry A. Myers. *Are Men Equal?* N. Y.: Putnam, 1945.

[6]Cf. Lawrence G. Thomas. "Blind Devotion vs. Devoted Understanding," *School and Society.* vol. 53, pp. 461-465. April 12, 1941.

[7]Cf. Peter F. Drucker. "The New Society," *Harper's Magazine.* September, 1949.

2. Cooperation requires adherence to the principles of majority rule and minority rights where consensus (general agreement) cannot be obtained. Unless the right of a minority to be heard, even when what it advocates is unpopular, is maintained, there can be no competition of ideas or alternative solutions to problems advanced in the market place of public opinion and hence no possibility of advancing new ideas or solutions which may become the majority opinion. Since the majority opinion at a given time may not constitute the best solution of a given problem, the ability of a minority to advocate change makes possible the continued consideration of all alternatives and hence can lead to new policy or revision of old policy. What may be viewed as new or even radical today, may become the commonplace of tomorrow. So it has been in American history.[8]

III. Development of Reason or Intelligence.

1. The use of reason requires the spread of enlightenment through free agencies of communication and "final loyalty to the best that study can find."[9]

2. Without the unfettered spread of enlightenment mutual respect and cooperation are impossible.

3. Civil Liberties, Bill of Rights, Four Freedoms, Academic Freedom, and Free Inquiry set forth principles and concepts concerning conditions which make possible the spread of enlightenment.

4. Reason is to be distinguished from "rationalization" or from explanation in terms of original causation or ultimate ends; the latter are not subject to verifiability on scientific grounds. Reason in the solution of social problems involves the capacity to make rational judgments upon the basis of evidence in the modification of invidiously based power and prestige systems.

The Validity of Democracy

Democracy is most efficient in carrying on the social process. It is the only social philosophy available that has as its ideal the development of the capacities of all individuals and the opportunity to use them. One curious thing about the traditional faith in democracy is the common avowal of a belief in it despite its inefficiency, cumbersomeness and slowness. The position taken here is that democracy is valid precisely because of its evidentially demonstrable efficiency. It represents the most efficient process of determining and administering policy in the carrying on of the social process and the promotion of distinctively human behavior. This is true because it represents thinking in terms of process rather than ends. It is the only alternative method of determining social policy presently avail-

[8]See A. M. Schlesinger. *New Viewpoints in American History.* N.Y.: Macmillan, 1922; and H. S. Commager. "Who is Loyal to America," *Harper's Magazine.* September, 1947.

[9]William H. Kilpatrick. "Philosophy of Education from the Experimentalist Outlook," *Philosophies of Education,* 41st. Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education, Part 1, Chicago: The Department of Education, The University of Chicago, 1942. pp. 39-86.

able which makes it continuously possible to modify invidious be-
havior patterns in the solution of problems. Efficiency, like other
value words, is subject to identification in invidious or instrumental
terms. Quite clearly democracy is not an efficient method for promot-
ing or maintaining any pattern of prestige and power. But if the dis-
tinctive characteristic of the cumulative process of human experience
is the modification of invidiously based power and prestige systems
under the impact of scientific-technological advance, then, any
rational ethic must find the referent for efficiency in the solution of
problems in this process and not in the promotion of any prestige
and power system.

It was this insight which prompted John Dewey to lay out the out-
lines of a psychological theory which is consistent with democratic
living. Gordon Allport has recently charged that, although Dewey's
psychological theories may "be fundamentally correct," they are in
part "ideologically derived" because he "forthwith proceeded to
tailor his own view of human nature to fit the requirements of
democratic living."[10] The implicit assumption here is that human
beings were not thinking and behaving before psychologists began
experimenting with their behavior. In fact, Dewey's psychological
theory rests on the same evidence and is an application of the same
general principles of human behavior as the rest of his theory. His
psychology is derived from his theory of the role of creative intelli-
gence in the transformation of behavior and ideas in the social pro-
cess. It is not happenstance, as Allport would appear to have it, that
more recent experimentation has "confirmed many of Dewey's major
assertions." As C. E. Ayres points out in the same magazine, "what
he (Dewey) has shown us is a matter of fact. It is not a matter of
how, in some tribal or transcendental sense, we ought to think, but a
matter of how we do actually think."[11] Dewey's theory of human
nature and his theory of democracy both rest upon an analysis of
human behavior in the social process. If this analysis be correct,
and unless man be an enigma, it is not to be wondered at that ex-
perimental findings in psychology lend support to his major thesis.
It is of greater significance that the experimental evidence is giving
us direct clues as to how to produce self-directing, cooperative in-
dividuals.[12]

[10]Gordon W. Allport. "Psychology and the Fourth R," *New Republic*. Oct-
ober 17, 1949. pp. 23-26.

[11]C. E. Ayres. "Instrumental Economics," *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[12]Kurt Lewin. *Resolving Social Conflicts*. N.Y.: Harper, 1948. Chapter 5,
pp. 71-83. See also bibliography, pp. 217-220; A. Bavelas and K. Lewin.

Democracy promotes self-directing, cooperative individuals. It promotes the brotherhood of man. It promotes the unity and solidarity of all peoples. It is the only social philosophy which is non-invidious in character and hence is the only system which gives a real measure of individual freedom, freedom to realize individual potentialities and freedom to participate with human dignity in the process of making decisions from among available alternatives in the solution of problems of common concern. Democracy, therefore, constitutes the only successful effort to reconcile personal and public interests. Under it freedom and authority do not constitute a dualism. They are not antagonistic, but are means to each other.[13]

Democracy and Authoritarianism

Spokesmen for authoritarian ways of living, in which some criteria of an invidious nature are employed to deny to some individuals participation in the policy-determining process, frequently point to the contradictions in democratic societies as to the extent and character of the participation of individuals in the democratic process. It is true that the democratic way of living in which all people are eager, able and free to participate in the policy-determining process is one that needs to be more fully realized. However, we can think of authoritarianism and democracy as polar ends of a continuum. Somewhere along that line any society may be placed with respect to its degree of authoritarianism or democracy. Modern authoritarian countries like Germany under Hitler or Russia under Stalin can be properly placed on that continuum toward the extreme end labeled "authoritarianism" in a consideration of the totality of opportunities which people living under these regimes have in participating in policy-determination. Democratic countries like the United States and England can be properly placed toward the opposite end of the continuum in terms of the totality of opportunities their people have in such a process.

The essential difference between the two systems is not that there are no examples of the opposed way of living to be found under either system. The essential difference lies in the fact that author-

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"Training in Democratic Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology.* vol. 37, pp. 115-119, 1942; R. Lippitt. "Studies on Experimentally Created Autocratic and Democratic Groups," *University of Iowa Studies: Studies in Child Welfare.* vol. 16, pp. 45-198, 1940.

[13]John Dewey. "Authority and Social Change," *Authority and the Individual.* Harvard Tercentenary Publications. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1937. pp. 170-190.

itarianism posits some criteria of discrimination as to whom shall participate in policy-determination, and justifies these criteria upon certain values viewed as ultimates, as inevitable. The Communist as an authoritarian propagandist refuses to admit the basic difference in the two ways of living. He attempts to identify his way of life as democratic. Both the Communist and the Fascist make use of our contradictions and inconsistencies for propaganda purposes, though the latter makes no pretense of being democratic or of seeking some ultimate, democratic end.

Democracy, on the other hand, denies the validity of any invidious criterion for withholding participation to any one or for justifying institutional status quo. Even though there are examples of invidious criteria denying participation to some at the governmental level of policy-determination, the existence of such examples constitutes a denial of the fundamental concepts upon which American government rests. Because government is the primary rule-making authority of any society, the application of democracy as a criterion of judgment at this level makes possible and necessary the modification of invidiously based patterns of control over other people's behavior in all areas of living as the discriminatory nature of ideas and institutional arrangements become evident. The history of the United States and England demonstrates the expansion of the democratic process to areas of human interaction on a constantly widening front. That the characterisic of policy-making under democratic government noted above has brought about a higher level of participation upon the part of people in all areas of policy-determination is evident. In those areas of living in a democracy where authoritarian procedures are still in evidence, steps are being taken to change them to democratic procedures. Many dogmas involving a criterion of inequality, even those which at times have had official sanction in various areas of institutional life, have been unable to withstand the progressive movement toward the extension of the democratic way of life. Current dogmas of this character are on their way out. When the hypothesis set forth in this article becomes the common property of the community, their denouement will be hastened. The use of democracy as a criterion of judgment will have become a working tool in the solution of problems and therefore in the extension of freedom.

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THE PLACE OF LOCAL HISTORY IN MODERN EDUCATION

Maurice P. Moffatt and Stephen G. Rich

To discuss this problem adequately, we must start with a clear-cut conception of just what constitutes local history. Clearly, it will not do to consider local history as simply those events of wider import which have occurred within a particular locality. The history of any locality is a fabric woven in time, by the people who inhabited that area. Local history, though tied up into the wider story of the state and the nation and the world, nevertheless must be treated as the pageant of men, women and events within the locality, if it is to have significance as an educative experience.

Thus, it would hardly be fair to make the local history of Titusville, Pa., consist primarily of the Drake drilling, the first wells (1859), the oil rush, Pithole City and the later decline. This story is perhaps the high point of drama for Crawford County, but is far from constituting the entire local history of that community. Likewise, the birth of Stephen Grover Cleveland at Caldwell, N. J. is only a small incident in the history of Horseneck Village (as it once was called).

In each of these cases, the story of the settlement, the growth of the community, its changes as economic conditions forced them to occur, and the successive waves of people who came into these communities, provide us with a small-scale basal example, typifying the point of view which we call "the American way of life." A real treatment of the local story is therefore fundamental source material from which the child in school can get an understanding of his country as well as his own region. When we know local history, the slight differences such as town meeting government in Vermont and county units in Alabama, "the Yankee drawl of New Hampshire" and the languid Southern speech of North Ca'lina, the West Virginia man calling it a "poke" and the Washingtonian a "paper bag," seem properly, correctly, local variations within the fundamental way of life common to us throughout North America. (The authors would specifically include much of Canada within what is said throughout this article)

Let us first define the term "local", lest confusion be generated. Normally, and with exceptions frequently made, the county becomes the basal American unit for locality in the sense in which local history belongs to a locality. The exceptions will be discussed immediately after we state our fundamental idea.

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The county normally is the unit of local loyalty or tradition. This we might expect, historically, since counties usually arose as the first (and in the South the only) organs of local social control. The county seat naturally, therefore, became the political center, and around the court house grew up the commercial center, the major churches of the area, and often the first schools. A center for higher learning, whether academy or college or both, was characteristic of the county, especially in Ohio and Indiana.

Exceptions are very numerous. Thus, in New England, the "town" rather than the county was the focal point of interest. We pause, perhaps needlessly, to note that in New England and New York, the word "town" does not mean a built-up community, but an area possessing its own organs of self-government, often for a strictly rural area. This same sort of local area, governing itself in a similar fashion, is known as "township" in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania.

Accordingly, for New England the county is in the main not the unit for local history. There are cases, such as Barnstable County, Mass., Knox and Androscoggin Counties, Maine, in which county lines coincide so closely with the areas within which the people feel they are one community, that in these cases the county can be taken for local history purposes exactly as is normal elsewhere.

But adjacent to Androscoggin County, Maine, is a striking example of the contrary situation. Oxford County is only a judicial and deed-registering unit. "West Oxford" (Fryeburg, Brownfield, Hiram, and Porter towns, perhaps with Denmark, Stow, and Lovell also) form a distinct community, isolated by wooded hill country from Oxford County proper. North of the Androscoggin River is the woods country which actually is almost without local history. We forbear to multiply examples, merely mentioning that Berkshire Co., Mass., is definitely several communities.

The county fair, which was the central event of the year in the agrarian stage of America's development, strikingly underlines this fact of the county as the basal unit of locality. This event still is a focal point of interest, not only where agriculture has remained the dominant industry, but where the motor age has knit industrial towns into the same fabric. In the case of Oxford County, Maine, the existence of the large fair at Norway and the little one at Fryeburg each year, equally underlines our contention that this is a two-community county. Many fairs have been abandoned, but an encouraging sign in some areas of late, has been the revival of these fairs. The familiar harness races, stock parade, and a modern touch, modern farm machinery, have revitalized these gatherings.

Other exceptions occur when county lines divide a community. The type case is Plainfield (Union County), North Plainfield and Greenbrook Township (Somerset County) forming one community in New Jersey. Again, we get the county which has been divided, such as old Bergen County, New Jersey, now and for over a century the two counties of Hudson and Bergen. The thinking student or teacher will find no difficulty in handling any exceptional cases of these and other sorts.

The county-seat very frequently is our historical archive for many features of local history. The large homes built at various periods in county-seats provide a living record of the manners as well as the taste in architecture of each period in our national development that is represented. The large verandas, often screened against insects, tell of the gracious living of past days. The old large carriage houses, now perhaps converted into separate livable homes, likewise tell the story of how people lived when our American habit of mind was being formed. The rose-gardens, which have lasted to our days and are found in such other monuments of old times as the Roosevelt Crum Elbow house at Hyde Park, N. Y. are a characteristic feature.

Counties which are of more recent origin, or whose development is more recent, will naturally show only newer historical sights. Thus, in Mercer Co., W. Va., the county buildings at Princeton form a typical example of what a community just emerging from agriculture into mining, could have around 1890. The temporary buildings at that county seat long ago vanished, so that there is hardly anything previous to World War I to be seen anywhere on any street in Princeton, W. Va.

The city child can still see these features in his county-seat, as on Beacon Street in Boston or in the Murray Hill and Lenox Hill districts in New York. Let us not forget that Boston, besides its other features, is still "Suffolk Court House," Mass., and New York is county-seat for the county of the same name, coterminous with Manhattan Island.

We have now established a working understanding of what constitutes a locality for our purposes and what constitutes local history. In so doing, we have now brought attention to the county-seat as the most likely center for vivid understanding of such facts.

It remains forthwith a necessity to fit this group of facts into instruction in either history (in the older sense) or social studies, (if we are educating according to the newer ideas of coordinated studies without regard to traditional divisions into subject-matter fields.) We who write this are both convinced that the particular

framework into which local history shall be fitted is not a matter of significance so much as an accident of the mechanism of modern curriculum construction.

As we have dealt with our traditions, background and history, we have not yet found the real rootage which can connect these directly with the pupils' immediate environments and their everyday experiences. As a fair proportion normally remain in the same area throughout life, adult experience will be enhanced by rooting it in understanding of the local community....not merely its present conditions, but its origins and its trends.

The rootage desired can, in our judgment, most surely be secured by delving into the local history of the community in which we are teaching. We make a categorical statement, which we are prepared to defend: No community is so new, so raw, or so unusual, that it can fail to provide sufficient local history for a wide-awake, interested educator to use as the bridge between the pupil's own immediate experiences or needs and the historical background which will enable him to understand what he will do as a citizen. Perhaps we should take a paragraph or two to emphasize this fact.

Certainly, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, is a community "without roots or history", if any such community ever existed. Comparable to it would be only San Francisco, Poker Gulch, or Johannesburg (South Africa) in the first years of the gold rushes. Yet in eacn such case, the slight local history, if investigated, could reveal many illuminating and interesting facts. To these the pupils' own background could be attached, to enrich it and to make it comprehensible. What child does not point with pride to the history of his community, if he only knows of it? Adults are the same way. Every Rotarian, visiting another club, mentions proudly the highlights of his own community.

Even as early as 1854, when the youngest children, brought there as babes in arms, might have started school in San Francisco, there was the saga of the assembling of gold-seekers, of every nationality and no nationality, to start that local history...indeed, the First Vigilance Committee had already demonstrated spontaneous democracy in self-government.

This same California story has an interesting sequel which is typical of many communities in which the natural resource that led to the first settling was depleted. The Californians in Sacramento County, for example, found their soil, climate and location was ideal for extensive agricultural or horticultural pursuits. Thus, a new era came to California communities after the gold-rush was past history. Further south in the state, as at Ventura, the fruit-growing

economy was again disrupted, when the discovery of oil opened a new industrial era.

Up to this point, we have been concerned to establish precisely what the term "local history" includes; to set forth the manner in which such material is readily visible; and to emphasize that no community, however poor or raw, is without resources of this sort. We mention that for most communities a written recoord of some sort has found its way into print, either as articles in a local newspaper, or as a book of some sort. We doubt, however, if the existence of such source works is generally known. Probably only a few teachers in the Caldwell, N. J. public schools, for example, know of the existence of the book "Old Caldwell", a masterpiece of this sort of study, published in the mid-1920's. Nor is the readable brochure, "History of Verona" for the next town to the east, probably known to those teaching in the elementary schools in that borough.

The real problem, is, however, still before us. That is the construction of the attachment or linkage between local history and the educative experiences of the school. In general terms, our thesis is that at any point possible, and every point possible, the teacher can bring home to the pupil the specific local bearing of the material under consideration.

Whether under "history" separately, or in social science taught unifiedly, the matter of the turnpikes, the toll roads, of the period around 1810 to 1835, will certainly form a portion of the content at one stage. For some parts of the country this cannot be made concrete. But we cite a few cases in which present day arteries of traffic can be brought in, rather than the typical examples given in the textbooks and syllabi:

> In Lynnfield, Danvers, Topsfield and Rowley, Mass., U. S. 1 is the old toll road, the Newburyport Turnpike.

> In Albany, Guelderland, Cherry Valley, Richfield Springs, Bridgewater, Cazenovia, La Fayette, Skaneateles, Seneca Falls, N. Y. as well as places in between, U.S. 20 is the old Cherry Valley Pike.

> In Bloomfield, Glen Ridge, Montclair, Cedar Grove, Little Falls, Wayne, Mountain View, Pequannock, Pompton Plains and Riverdale, N.J., Bloomfield Avenue and Pompton Avenue are the old "Big Road", a toll turnpike built by the "King Crane" interests and bought by the counties for a public road as late as 1875.

The plain fact is that the alert teacher, neglecting the "typical" turnpike and the old National Road, may well follow the time-

honored educational maxim, "from the known to the unknown" with strikingly great effect, by dealing with the turnpikes via the local one that still persists as an artery, for the starting-point and chief example. Indeed, the teacher in Summit, Chatham and Madison, N.J. who does not go further and link up the matter to the road still called "Shunpike Way", the rural road used by the farmers to avoid paying tolls on the Morris Turnpike, is missing an illuminating bit of history.

These turnpike examples will give us the key to the adequate use of local history in educative activities. In every possible case, the local example, rather than the famous one, need be the starting point. Thus, the Indian raids promoted by the British during the Revolution can be best taught in Bethel and Locke's Mills, Maine, from the one on the settlers in that "Sudbury-Canada" settlement from Massachusetts in the earliest days. The prehistoric Indian culture of the Mound Builders is strictly local history in East St. Louis, Ill., which includes what is left of Cahokia. (We wonder often why that city hasn't renamed itself Cahokia, years ago).

The teacher beginning work, whether for the first time, or on moving into a community after service elsewhere, may well find it profitable to delve into the history of the locality in which work has now been taken up. The knowledge of the local shibboleths, local heritage, and the personalities which are held in historic esteem, is a means of acquiring rapport with the pupils and parents alike. It also enables the teacher to make vivid, from the very start, the instructional work undertaken.

Thus, at Chappaqua, N.Y., a great figure of the anti-slavery movement and a presidential candidate in the 1870's was long a resident in that village. Horace Greeley is no distant figure in Chappaqua, not a mere historical personage, but a fellow-townsman, who walked the streets of the then rural village on the New York and Harlem Railroad (still an existent company, but operated as part of the New York Central). Here local history connects directly with the national scene. Not every community is fortunate enough to have such a case....but on a lesser scale, there always is some such contact somewhere along the line. Custer of the famous Last Stand is similarly the link between local and national history at New Rumley, Ohio and so is the man that all of Harrison County in that state is likely to esteem.

Practically every locality in the United States links up to one or another important phase of our economic development, by one feature or another. Thus, energetic and intelligent people, located at a water-

power site, made Waterbury, Conn. the great center for manufactures utilizing brass. A little further north on the same Naugatuck River, human power and initiative alone made the Collins firm suppliers of machetes to the whole Latin-American world even to our own day. Originally situated there because of supplies of wagon-making timber, the Studebaker firm at South Bend, Ind., kept pace with a changing technology, and developed into the present great automotive concern. Similar cases are so prevalent that we dare not expand our illustrations.

The social and economic problems which seem vague, terrifying and immense when discussed on a national scale, perhaps furnish a field in which approach via local history can furnish the needed understanding with least difficulty. No child in Evansville, Indiana, who lived through the recent floods that came up to the front of the McCurdy Hotel but never got as high as the Post Office, can fail to understand the flood problem in its various ramifications, if this item of local history is made a starting-point. Galveston, with its great hurricane of 1900 and its reconstruction behind the magnificent new sea-wall, is a piece of local history which can serve there to introduce the pupils to many aspects of our development. The most significant of these is the genesis of a form of municipal government based on the commission that was set up to restore that city. The wide acceptance of this form of local government is a direct result of the test of its worth that occurred under such circumstances.

Our own age is one of great and sudden economic change. Established industries may be become obsolete unexpectedly and in short time by virtue of some new discovery or invention. More often still, large and successful establishments find technological aging coming upon them unnoticed.

In some communities, a striking feature of their history is the effort of one or more major industries to avoid such events, by making their own advances. This is accomplished through constant experimentation and research in highly equipped research centers. The barn of Charles P. Steinmetz in Schenectady, N.Y. is still standing; it is the local reminder of the origin of G.E.'s great laboratory which keeps that city in the van of industrial progress.

But there are communities in which no such foresight existed. Thus it was at Manchester, N. H., where technological aging ruined the Amoskeag Mfg. Co.'s cotton mills. Southern competition was able to do this only because it started with modern machinery and methods, while Amoskeag was operating 1860-made looms in the 1920's. This particular community shows what has happened in many such

cases. Manchester, now a city of many divergent industries, none of them domiciled there prior to 1930, has prospered as never when it was a cotton-mill town. Knowledge of such cases, as of the triple successive revivals of Paterson, N.J. with new industries, can help produce citizenries alive to the need for dynamic leadership in the future. The sense of pride in a community that has pulled itself out of decay by its own initiative, is a valuable community asset. Such content in social studies teaching may go far to develop this attitude.

The great difficulty in handling local history is to estimate at their real significance the events of recent periods and our own times. Far more than in nation-wide historical study, it is easy to miss the importance of some happenings. Thus, the significance of an apparently obscure event may well be missed. Examples of this are almost too numerous to mention, yet a few may bring the point out clearly.

Thus, the story of aviation as a means within modern living begins with the little-noticed work of Orville and Wilbur Wright in their bicycle shop at Dayton, Ohio, constructing their plane and the engine to power it. A strange quirk in this romantic story is their use of the distant beaches at Kitty Hawk, N.C. for the actual trial flights. Nobody then connected Dayton with Kitty Hawk, nor foresaw the effects of what was done by the Wrights. Now a fitting monument marks the spot at Kitty Hawk, though not a bit of the actual aviation industry is today situated even near this locality.

Even to this day there stands unnoticed and unmarked, on Western Avenue, in Lynn, Mass., the first building of the Thomson-Houston Electric Co. in which the first dynamos were made for regular everyday use in this country. Truly this obscure unit of General Electric's old Lynn Works is a permanent monument of local history which in its effects changed our lives conspicuously.

Let us not limit "local history" to that of our own community. Every community has a local history, which may be significant for other communities. Thus, old Boston in Revolutionary days has local history which can mean much in understanding that era. For example, a rich source would be the biography of the smuggler-merchant-patriot John Hancock. The "forgotten men of history" who have found place in some recent works are often more significant to the student than are those more widely known. Elias Howe, Edward Bellamy, and Ignatius Donnelly are typical cases, as is that great but too little known electrician, Elihu Thomson. Let us not limit ourselves to the men of the past. Those living and working today will in the future be commemorated in the books. To hunt out their

doings and accomplishments while they are yet with us may well be the most fascinating part of local history when they live in our own communities.

Men or women are not appreciated at the time when they make their real contributions. It is when the results of these have been seen, and the benefits have occurred, that the appreciation is made. Fortunately, a fair number of these contributors have lived to see these happy results. The conspicuous case, known to us all, and forming a part of local history for Essex County in New Jersey, is of course Edison. But the child growing up near Washington Square in New York, N.Y. can know of the honored Professor of Art at the University who invented the telegraph and lived to reap the reward: Samuel Finley Breese Morse.

Local history has become much more accessible, and its significance made better known, by the growth of historical societies in all parts of the country. The roadside markers, the historical buildings preserved or restored, and the showings in these societies' museums, all are major helps in bringing home to the pupils the crucial fact: *History has occurred right here where we are.*

In fact, the wealth of material demonstrating that history has occurred everywhere is almost embarrassing in many cases. Family records and mementos can often be brought into use by the cooperation of the pupils. In many families, for example, World War I can be brought out by some such remnant as Father's old uniform and service stripes. Jubilees and centenaries and bicentenaries, held by various communities, tend to make real that same fact: *history has occurred right here where we are.* Thus the events are perpetuated and the traditions which forms the background of our thought and habits is brought into being.

Even the lighter side of life is history and the lighter side always occurs strictly locally. The Kentucky Derby, for example, is run annually at Churchill Downs, Louisville, Ky. In its recent running, a greater crowd than ever attended. Here is a feature of life in older days which has not merely continued, but has taken on new glamour and features.

History has always occurred right here where we are. Multiply this by the thousands of separate communities and we have the nation's history. From what happened at Kittery, Maine in 1905, in San Francisco in 1906, in Collinwood, Ohio in 1908, in Los Angeles in 1910, in Washington in 1911, and so on, the history of the period was built up. Each event is part of local history as much as of national.

In handling local history, one bit of technique may well make the difference between success and failure. This is almost a "trick", a mere bit of method, but it really does count. What has happened, and the way people lived, has to be worded in the language of today.

Let us be specific with some examples. When we discuss Nathan Hale, saying that he gave his life "in dangerous Army intelligence service," we are not merely correct. We are making his actions comprehensible and significant to the young people of today. Place names, in particular, need to be translated into their modern equivalents. Thus, before the battle of Trenton, N.J., our army came down Route 29. That statement places it on present-day highways in Ewing Township. The meeting of the rails at Promontory Point in 1869 must be located on the "old line" of the Southern Pacific's Sunset Route, to be correctly grasped by pupils — not merely on the "Central Pacific" which is no longer an operating rail company. If some local man went to Russia as ambassador, we speak of his being at Leningrad, not at the twice-changed former name of that city (St. Petersburg); nor does a Norse pioneer in Minnesota come from "Christiania" but from Oslo. Again, the Pony Express went through Laramie, its present name, not "Fort Laramie."

Our hope in this article is that we have here given at least the outline or start of a guide for teachers, on whatever level, for the handling of local history. We have purposely used examples from a wide range in both time and space, so that nobody from Calais to San Diego, from Key West to Kahoolawe, Olympia or Nome, will be at a loss by imagining that local history does not exist where he is.

History has happened where we are. "Local history" is that part of it which we feel belongs particularly to our own lives, because it has directly affected what we do, where we go, how we act. It is not a separate kind or part of history, but the raw material of all history, the part of history that the younger persons can most readily and enjoyably grasp.

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THE SOCIAL DRAMA PROGRAM: A TECHNIQUE
OF TEACHING SOCIOLOGY

Arthur Katona

Drama as an educational tool is being used increasingly by teachers and therapists.[1] Its utilization has resulted in several refinements that we may call dramatic techniques in education, the principal ones perhaps being psychodrama, sociodrama, role-playing, and social drama. These may be distinguished roughly by noting that psychodrama is an acting out of emotional conflicts by a patient with others who as actors aid in the emotional catharsis, sociodrama is the enactment of a social situation so that the participants can feel its import and come to a deeper understanding of it, role-playing is the more or less spontaneous play-acting of a character or scene to vividly illustrate a point in the study of human relations, again stressing an emotional grasp of the matter, and social drama is the staging of a regularly rehearsed play so that the audience may discuss and analyze the dramatized problem.

All of these techniques carry the implication that in order to effectively understand human relations, we must complement the intellect with the emotions. The mind is not enough; the heart is equally important in the acquiring of understanding of others. Indeed, it has been said that only through a warm, emotional rapport can we really grasp the meaning of social interaction; intellectual analysis, it is maintained, is too cold and distant, too aloof for the necessary emphatic accord.[2]

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[1] A brief mention of work carried on is enough to indicate the widening scope of its use. J. L. Moreno's psychodramatic therapy in the treatment of mental illness is well known. His books and papers show in detail how he has been developing this approach. Leslie D. Zeleny points out how sociologists may use sociodrama in a paper,, "New Directions in Educational Sociology and the Teaching of Sociology," *American Sociological Review*, 13 (June, 1948), 336-337. Judson T. Landis in his book, *Building a Successful Marriage*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1948, sets up a number of sociodramas chapter by chapter for teachers and students of marriage and family relations. I have dealt, tentatively, with the subject in an article, "Social Theatre," *Theatre Arts*, 31 (July, 1947), 75-77 and in a paper, "Social Drama in Education," *The Educational Forum*, 13 (May, 1949), 462-467.

[2] Emotional warmth and spontaneity are stressed in the free association techniques of psychoanalysts. Theodore Reik argues for a heart-centered, intuitive feel of the patient's problem in his *Listening With the Third Ear: The Inner Experience of a Psychoanalyst*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Co., 1949. Carl Rogers with his nondirective counseling emphasizes the warm heart in dealing with clients (*Counseling and Psychotherapy*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1942).

I shall confine the remainder of this article to one dramatic technique, that previously mentioned as social drama. A description of an actual social drama project will give the feel of the technique. As may be noted, the method can be used by teachers of sociology, group workers, club officials, ministers, community leaders, and others interested in a novel approach to the understanding of intergroup relations.

The topic of study was race relations and here of course Negro-white relations proved to be the most immediate and pressing issue. A colleague and I, believers in the educational value of dramatic techniques, decided to highlight our analysis of Negro-white relations with a dramatization of prejudices held by whites. If white students could feel, even though vicariously, the suffering endured by Negroes in a prejudice-ridden society and if whites and Negroes sharing a common emotion could frankly face up to a mutual problem, discuss it openly, and together thresh out possible solutions, we would take a big step in understanding the race issue and toward acceptance of another race as fellow men and co-workers in the common enterprise of building democracy.

With a small group of eager white and colored students, who were to be members of the cast for a one-act play, we went to work on a social drama program. Our cooperative efforts lived up to the four rules I had suggested in the paper "Social Drama in Education" mentioned in footnote 1. These rules are: (1) Have a good script, one that is short, emotionally concentrated, and does not preach; its dramatic action speaks for itself. (2) Round up an enthusiastic cast and director; they must believe in what they are doing and work hard at it. (3) Get a dynamic forum leader or leaders, personalities who can give of themselves and draw out contributions from the audience. (4) Carefully plan the discussion period; that is, have the opening, follow-through, and concluding analysis well-timed and have the leaders prepared with facts and figures on the problem being considered.

My colleague and I chose as script a powerful one-acter, "All Aboard," by Ben Bengal. The play depicts with vivid, racy realism what happens in a coach of white and colored passengers when the train, from the north, crosses the Mason-Dixon line. We had leading members of the cast come together for a preliminary reading. The Negro students reacted at once and in a positive manner. It is an excellent play, they said, but for our purposes it needs to be brought up to date and the Negro characters should be changed from semi-literate, humble folks to educated, self-respecting personalities. A

colored girl proposed that we change most of the characters to college students and have them ride the train. Thereupon a white girl offered to help rewrite the script.

We all agreed it was a fine idea. So for several afternoons Negro girl and white girl toiled together on the rewrite job. They brought out a breezy, forceful script of college students licking Jim Crow down south.

Rehearsals in themselves turned out to be an exhilarating social education. We worked and played as comrades in an exciting and worth-while venture. The director, in this instance my colleague, was no dictator but a guiding co-operator welcoming suggestions from any and all and putting into effect those that advanced the feeling and action of the play. At the same time he led our efforts so as to get maximum results from the given time and material.

We secured two capable men, a Negro and a white, for discussion leaders. They constituted an interracial panel and their studies and experiences were to contribute greatly to the discussion. The Negro half of the panel was chairman of the local community's committee on civil rights; the white was a graduate student in education. The Negro leader had been making a survey of employment and other opportunities—or, rather, lack of opportunities—for colored people in the community and had data at hand that brought the discussion down to realities right at home.

The dramatics department kindly lent us the use of the little theatre for dress rehearsal and performance. An interested member of the department gave us valuable technique aid and on the night of performance made the preliminary announcement of the nature of our presentation that usually starts off a social drama program.

The following introductory section, slightly changed here, from our mimeographed theatre programs indicates how the project was set up and its co-operative nature. No mention is made of Negro and white. We did not want to call attention to racial personalities but to men and women of good will working together in a common cause. Actual names, though appearing on the original program, are now omitted.

ALL ABOARD

A social problem play by Ben Bengal.

Adapted by —— —— and —— —— of —— —— College.
To be followed by audience discussion
led by a panel of two discussion leaders.
This is a social drama program cooperatively presented by students and faculty

members. It is sponsored by ——— ———, director of the play and member of the cast, and by ——— ———, member of the cast, who are on the staff of the Department of ——— ———. The discussion will be led by ——— ———, Chairman of the ——— Committee on Civil Rights, and ——— ———, graduate student in education.

On performance night our hearts beat faster and we trembled inwardly, nervous and rarin' to go. What actor doesn't have these thrill pangs and doesn't remember them with delight? To our elation the play came off, fast, exciting, without any untoward breaks. To be sure it was no finished performance, but it held the audience. We could sense they were with us, laughing heartily at the comedy lines and tensing up grimly at the Jim Crow scenes.

The discussion leaders role-played their entrance instead of formally walking on the stage and being introduced. With suitcases in their hands they came through the partially drawn curtain to the front of the stage talking about the ruckus that had just taken place in their coach. Soon they drew their audience into their conversation, and the discussion was on.

White and colored people frankly, movingly, sympathetically talked out mutual problems. Ideas and emotions poured forth eagerly as though a restraining wall had broken. It was as if the audience had been waiting and storing up for such an opportunity for face-to-face and heart-to-heart release.

I especially remember two high lights, one compounded of ironic comedy, the other of deeply touching pathos. A pleasant, middle-aged gentleman remarked how he liked the Negro people, how he envied their happy, cheerful disposition, how white people could learn much from their good nature, and that things weren't nearly so bad as the play depicted. The crowd genially held its mirth and waited expectantly for the discussion leaders to comment. The colored member of the panel responded in gracious style. Cordially he thanked the speaker for the kind words about his people and added gently that they would like to trade some of their happiness for some of the white man's democracy. The audience let go with good-natured laughter and applause.

Toward the end of the discussion a woman stood up and in a subdued, moving voice gave thanks for the evening's program and confessed that up to now she had not been aware of the injustices suffered by Negroes. She went on to say that she would keep up her awakened interest in the problem and would like to work with others toward its solution. Her heartfelt words, haltingly, ingenuously spoken, drew everyone together. It was like sharing a profound religious experience.

The Negro member of the panel brought the discussion to a close
with a concrete summary of the worsening housing and employment
disabilities of Negroes in the outlying community. There is solid
work to do, we all felt, and it begins at home.

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BOOK REVIEWS

HUMAN RELATIONS IN CURRICULUM CHANGE

by Benne, Kenneth D., and Bozidar Muntyan (editors), The Dryden Press, New York, 1951, xiii 363 pp. $3.25.

This volume is a revised reprint of a bulletin issued in 1950 by the
office of the Superintendent of Public Instruction of the state of
Illinois, and comprises forty-two readings drawn from fields of the
social sciences as well as education, plus explanatory material by the
editors. The purpose of the book, according to the editors, is to pre-
sent hypotheses (unverified, of course) which can be used and tested
by teachers, administrators, and others who are seeking to manage
"human factors" involved in curriculum change. For these hypothe-
ses, the editors draw mainly on two approaches to the study of so-
cial relations, namely, the analysis of "practical judgment" of R.
Bruce Raup, B. Othanel Smith, George Axtelle, and Kenneth D.
Benne, and the theories of Kurt Lewin and his co-workers. The ap-
proach of Moreno and others in sociometry and sociodrama is also
utilized.

The book is divided into five sections. The first is an introductory
statement concerning the neglect of "human factors" in the planning
and activating of curriculum change. This is followed by a series of
selections on human motivation, re-education, and organizational and
cultural change, brought together under the heading," Conceptual
Tools for Analyzing Change-Situations." Part Three is concerned
with the nature of social groups, leadership, group dynamics, tech-
niques for "improving group operations," and an application of
group theory to the school situation. The final two sections deal with
"democratic ethics" as related to the management of change and the
development of leadership for curriculum change.

This book is, to the reviewer as a social scientist, a surprising and encouraging attempt to apply theoretical materials from psychology, sociology and other social sciences to a practical problem in the field of education. Benne and Muntyan have not only brought together a number of theoretical contributions to the study of human groups in a handbook for the practical educator, but they have also pointed the way to a closer cooperation between education as a field and the other fields of the social sciences.

The reviewer of a book of readings feels it almost an obligation to promote materials which have not been included, and it is therefore suggested that these selections might well be supplemented by readings from such writers as George D. Homans, Robert F. Bales, and a whole host of scholars in the field of anthropology. As it stands, however, *Human Relations in Curriculum Change* is a collection valuable not only to the professional educator, but to anyone interested in the study of human group relations.

Blaine E. Mercer
University of Colorado

ON BEING HUMAN

by Ashley Montague. New York: Schuman. 1950

Not many modern thinkers would hold to the bald concepts of Social Darwinism as put forth by Spencer in another age. Yet I wonder how many still do believe that life is struggle, competition, and the survival of the fittest. Competition has been "prettified" and glorified and both Darwin and Malthus have been used to justify slave labor, child labor, unemployed labor, colonial imperialism, and the exploitation of "inferior" races. On the other hand the study of cooperative behavior has been neglected. It is true that anthropologists and sociologists have noted societies where no war exists and have been led to conclude that man is not born with hostile impulses which must always be watched and disciplined. One result of these studies is the idea that competition is always disfunctional for all individuals and groups. I wonder whether competition is present in all societies and whether social interaction by its very nature and regardless of the differences in social structure and type of culture makes for a situation where not all of the needs of all of the people can be met at the same time. It seems that there is bound to be some frustration, disappointment, anad resentment. This however does not mean, necessarily, that the competition or quest from relief of the

frustration must take its form in a hostile, destructive manner.

Man, Montague states, does want the dependent security, the feeling that one is part of the group, accepted, wanted, loved, and loving. He also has another "nonvital basic need" which Montague calls "social recognition". He is likely to achieve this recognition, in part at least, from some kind of competition, even if it is competition in being cooperative. Competition in the Western world would tend to make us "the partitive, disordered, hostile, egocentric creatures that we have become." Competition in an Eskimo society makes for singing contests.

The treatment which Montague suggests is "social engineering" through teaching children who will be the adult members of the next generations. He recognizes that this will require very resourceful teachers. Unfortunately the author does not spell out the nature of the resources or the methods.

Alfred Jones

of the past which have great meaning and create or discover (depending on whether you are following an authoritarian or humanistic tradition) those new values which are more commensurate with the needs of human personality in modern day situations.

Those who will resort to indoctrination or inculcation by authoritarian methods either do not have enough confidence in those whom they teach to believe that they would accept those values of the past which have validity if they examine them freely or else they feel that the values to which they subscribe could not stand intensive examination. In either instance, the integrity of personality is compromised. Against this kind of violation, educators must offer opposition.

Dan W. Dodson